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4. The Communist military situation in Korea appears to have reached a point where the Kremlin must choose between the abandonment of its aim of establishing Communist control throughout all of Korea, or of materially increasing the ~~xxxxxxx~~ the degree of Chinese Communist and/or Soviet participation. The Kremlin may be reluctant to pursue the latter alternative ~~because of~~ for one or more of the following ~~possible~~ reasons:

a. It may fear that if Chinese Communist or Soviet participation were increased to the level necessary ~~xx~~ for military victory, there would be grave danger that general war would develop.

b. The Chinese Communists may be unwilling to make further commitments in Korea without more assistance ~~xxxxxx~~ from the USSR than the Kremlin can or will provide.

~~xxxxxx

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Korea may ~~make~~ have made it impossible for the Chinese Communists to move in and support the forces necessary to regain the initiative on the ground.

5. The Soviet "cease fire" proposal has been made in the face of this situation. ~~While it is possible that the proposal was designed merely for propaganda purposes to serve Communist propaganda purposes by emphasizing the "peaceful" desires of the USSR~~

This proposal may have been designed merely for the propaganda purpose of emphasizing the USSR's desires for "peace". It may have been intended as a deceptive measure to screen, and as a pretext to justify, if rejected, intensified Communist military action. But it seems more probable that the Kremlin actually desires at least a temporary cessation of the Korean hostilities. If a cease-fire can thus be achieved the Kremlin will have open to it several possible courses of action.

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It can enter into negotiations on Korean political issues, seeking a settlement on terms which would favor the eventual establishment of Communist control throughout all of Korea by political and subversive means. If it fails in this, its maximum aim, it can nevertheless maintain and fortify the Communist position throughout North Korea. It may even move in Soviet forces in order to discourage the possible resumption of hostilities by UN forces, to displace Chinese Communist influence in the area, and perhaps to establish a bargaining counter to secure the withdrawal of UN forces from the South. Or it may take advantage of the respite from UN military pressure to move in and deploy Communist forces capable of launching a renewed major offensive.

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